We examine spatially correlated interregional flows measured as binary choice outcomes. Since the dependent variable is not only binary and dyadic, but also spatially correlated, we propose a spatial origin-destination probit model and a Bayesian estimation methodology that avoids inconsistent maximum likelihood estimates. We apply the model to militarized interstate dispute initiations, observations of which are clearly binary and dyadic and which may be spatially correlated due to their geographic distribution. Using a cross-section of 26 European countries drawn from the period leading up to WWII, we find empirical evidence for target-based spatial correlation and sizable network effects resulting from the correlation. In particular, we find that the effect of national military capability of the potential aggressor, which is a significant determinant of conflict in either case, is overstated in a benchmark model that ignores spatial correlation. This effect is further differentiated by the geographic location of a country.
Introduction
Spatial autocorrelation introduces computational challenges to mathematical modeling and has been widely studied by statisticians, political scientists, economists, geographers, and others. As is well-known, ignoring substantial spatial correlation may generate inefficient or even inconsistent parameter estimates. Spatial autocorrelation may be more prominent in data collected in a dyadic setting, in which a single observation consists of a pair of individuals, such as international conflict, international trade, or migration flows. Nonetheless, dyadic data and specifically directed dyadic data, where each observation contains a distinct origin and destination, present additional challenges, because correlation between two observations involves spatial correlation between up to four individuals. In addition, many dyadic series, such as conflict initiations, are also binary. That is, an observation records whether or not the event, transaction, or flow occurred, adding a third challenge to effective modeling.
Spatially correlated binary observations have been studied by McMillen (1992) , Dubin (1995) ,
and LeSage (2000) , among others, while spatially correlated directed dyadic observations have been studied more recently by Fischer et al. (2006) , LeSage et al. (2007) , and LeSage and Pace (2008, 2009) . The latter authors develop a spatial origin-destination (spatial OD) approach to modeling directional flows that involves three different types of spatial correlation. Their modeling strategy allows for correlations in (a) neighboring origins with a common destination, (b) neighboring destinations with a common origin, and (c) neighboring origins and neighboring destinations.
The methodological contribution of this paper addresses modeling dependent variables with statistical characteristics in the intersection of these three nonstandard yet realistic assumptions:
binary, dyadic, and spatially correlated data. We take an approach that extends the class of origin-destination (OD) models of LeSage and Pace (2008, 2009 ) by allowing for a binary and directed dyadic dependent variable. We show that a spatial OD probit model, highlighting all three features, may be estimated using a Bayesian method related to that discussed by LeSage and Pace (2009) . Further, we derive the marginal effects from changing a country-specific regressor in the model. This task is complicated not only in the usual way by the nonlinearity of the probit link function and the spatial correlation, but also by the OD structure of the data, as pointed out by LeSage and Thomas-Agnan (2012) .
We apply our methodology to a cross-section of binary dyadic observations on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Due to its devastating destructiveness to human lives and socioeconomic development, interstate war has been a very active research topic for political scientists and economists. The former group tends to focus more on the causal factors of war, while the latter may be more interested in examining the relationships between war and economic fundamentals (e.g., Blomberg and Hess, 2002; Hess and Orphanides, 2001; Koubi, 2005) .
We examine initiation of MIDs in a cross-section of 26 European countries during the period leading up to WWII. By modeling multiple sources of spatial correlation across directed dyads, the spatial OD probit model reveals how conflict initiations may be correlated. We find empirical evidence to support target-based (destination-based) spatial correlation, and we find the most statistically meaningful determinants of conflict to be geographical distance and national capabilities of the potential initiator. There are substantial network effects in the latter, the omission of which overstates its marginal importance. In particular, a military buildup in one country may decrease the probability of conflict between two others. An unexpected finding suggests that military buildups in countries at the edge of the map (the U.K., e.g.) have very different implications from buildups in countries in the center (Germany, e.g.) . Specifically, such buildups have less of an impact on conflict with the immediate neighbors of the former countries than on conflict with neighbors of the latter.
Sample selection focuses on a particular historical period and geographical location with a relatively large number of conflict initiations as a percentage of the sample. However, our findings are suggestive for any spatially correlated cross-section of conflict-prone units. We note, however, that more general conflict models might allow only local spillovers, in the sense of LeSage and Pace (2012) . Our model does not preclude the possibility that the military buildup of one country (Germany, e.g.) could increase the probability of conflict in the whole region, with the largest increases for conflicts with immediate neighbors.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate spatial OD modeling and outline the technical difficulties in applying the spatial OD model to binary dependent variables.
A Bayesian approach to the spatial OD probit model is presented in Section 3, and in Section 4, we discuss additional issues of empirical interest in estimating a spatial OD probit model: selfdirected dyads and marginal effects. In Section 5, we apply the model to conflict initiation among European countries leading up to WWII. We conclude with Section 6.
We rely on the following notation throughout the paper. The vec operator converts a matrix into a column vector by stacking its columns into a single vector. denotes the Kronecker product, and and denote n by 1 and N by 1 unit vectors, where n records the number of sampled countries and . refers to the determinant of a matrix .
Modeling Spatially Correlated Origin-Destination Flows
To motivate the spatial OD probit model, we borrow heavily from the structural and notational framework of LeSage and Pace (2008, 2009) . Since OD flows are directional, one pair of regions will yield two observations distinguished by reversing the origin and destination. Therefore, if regions are considered under a spatial OD model, the number of observations becomes .
We use an by square matrix to denote interregional flows from each of the origin regions to each of the destination regions, with each column recording a specific origin's outflows to each of the potential destination regions and each row corresponding to the inflows toward a given destination from each of the potential origins. (We use the superscript *, because we will consider these to be latent flows subsequently.)
Specifically, the OD flow matrix is organized as follows:
( )
To reflect an origin-centric ordering of OD flows (LeSage and Pace, 2008, p. 944) , the matrix is then vectorized into an N by 1 matrix , such that .
In a typical spatial interaction model, where each observation is a single region, explanatory variables that represent K region-specific characteristics for each of the n regions are represented by an n by K matrix . In keeping with the origin-centric arrangement of , is stacked n times in a spatial OD model to form an N by K matrix , which tallies destination characteristics. Similarly, produces an N by K matrix that contains origin characteristics. Representing by G an n by n OD distance matrix similar to the flow matrix above, is an N by 1 vector recording the distances from origins to destinations with an origin-centric ordering. LeSage and Pace (2008) extend the spatial autoregressive model by introducing spatial lags defined by three by row-standardized spatial weight matrices, , , and .
embodies the notion that factors causing flows from an origin to a destination may bring about similar flows to nearby destinations. Accordingly, the spatial lag attempts to pick up this type of destination-based dependence by the use of average flows from one origin to the neighbors of a given destination. Similarly, reflects origin-based dependence and the spatial lag measures an average of flows into one destination from the neighbors of a given origin.
Third, LeSage and Pace (2008) apply the "successive spatial filter" to control for both origin-based and destination-based dependence (origin-to-destination dependence 
where , and .
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Of course, when the observed dependent variable represents a binary outcome, such as the decision to initiate an interstate conflict, the spatial OD regression model in ( 1 ) is impractical.
Rather, researchers typically employ a probit or logit link function defined on the latent vector and generating the observed outcome vector .
Specifically, the latent variable is linked to the observed binary variable through the following measurement equation
where is the i th element of y for . The only difference between the spatial OD probit model and a standard probit model is the addition of spatial lag terms, which take into account the possibility of spatial correlation across dyadic flows, in ( 1 ).
3 A sufficient condition for existence of the inverse is that .
As is standard in these types of models, is assumed for identification. However, 
in place of ( 1 ). The key difference is that this model contains spatial lags of the observed binary vector rather than lags of the latent variable itself. 4 The standard ML-based probit estimator based on the diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix of is therefore feasible. However, since is a nonlinear function of , which is spatially correlated with the regressor, this estimator is no longer the ML estimator and may not be consistent. We refer to this as the "standard" probit estimator, since it would be the ML estimator in the absence of spatial correlation. Note that , , and do not need to be constrained in this specification. The signs may be comparable to those of , , and , but not the magnitudes.
Estimation
Spatial correlation in a binary model induces a truncated multivariate normal distribution Hajivassiliou, 1993, or Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998.) 
Conditional Posterior Distributions
The conditional prior density of takes the form
subject to .
We follow the common practice in Bayesian spatial modeling of assuming that follows a multivariate normal distribution and applying diffuse priors on the spatial lag parameters, , , and (LeSage and Pace 2009, p. 221). Specifically, we let and for and .
It is straightforward to show that where and denote the prior and posterior densities. This is proportional to
which follows by substituting in the conditional prior density of in ( 5 ) 
which is the kernel of a multivariate normal distribution. Thus, we can infer that the conditional posterior distribution is .
Similarly, the conditional posteriors of each for can be derived. Consider first .
Using the same argument as above for , we can write and this implies from ( 5 ) Unlike the conditional posterior for derived above, the conditional posterior distribution of each has an unknown form, and thus cannot be sampled directly. We use a MetropolisHastings algorithm to sample from these distributions.
Sampling
For brevity, we express the distribution of the latent variables as , subject to , with denoting the mean and representing the variance-covariance matrix. The fact that is not diagonal implies that the marginal distributions for individual elements of are not univariate truncated normal, thus ruling out the option of sampling directly from a sequence of univariate truncated normal distributions in order to obtain simulations for the individual elements .
To circumvent this problem, LeSage and Pace (2009) adopt Geweke's (1991) truncated multivariate normal simulator, which was subsequently refined by Hajivassiliou (1990) and Keane (1994) . 6 The so-called Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) truncated multivariate normal simulator samples recursively from truncated univariate normal distributions using a Cholesky factorization of the variance. The simulator is quite general, and is easily extended to cases of more complicated spatial correlation than the binary spatially correlated model estimated by
LeSage and Pace (2009).
5 LeSage and Pace (2009) suggest rejection sampling to further restrict , as discussed above. 6 The reader is referred to Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) for detailed exposition on the simulator.
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The GHK algorithm works as follows. Instead of drawing from the original distribution of the latent variable,
we draw a random vector
where is the Cholesky decomposition of .
Due to the triangular structure of , the restrictions on are recursive. Specifically,
s.t.
, and for ,
With this modified procedure, can be sampled sequentially from univariate truncated normal distributions. The simulated vector and the relationship are then used to simulate draws from the conditional posterior distributions of the other model parameters derived above.
Implementing the MCMC Sampling
Assigning arbitrary initial values for the parameters, denoted by the superscript , we sequentially sample the conditional distributions for the model parameters following the steps sketched below.
1. ( | ), which is a multivariate normal distribution with mean and variance defined in ( 6 ). Label the sampled vector . Then, return to step (1) and replace the initial values with the updated values . This process is repeated to obtain a large number of draws that can be used for inferences.
Additional Issues

Self-Directed Dyads
The diagonal elements of the OD flow matrix in Section 2 represent intra-regional flows, or selfdirected dyads, rather than inter-regional flows. They are often set to zero when the objective is to model inter-regional flows (e.g., LeSage and Pace, 2009) or, in this case, interstate conflicts.
As a result, the zero values of these observations are different in nature from those observed for non-conflict dyads. If we ignore this difference and treat the self-directed pairs the same as other dyads, the estimation results would be biased.
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Since we focus on interstate conflict, a sensible way to deal with self-directed dyads is to pull them out of the estimation procedure entirely, while preserving the correlation structure embodied by the weight matrices. To this end, we utilize a "selection" matrix to take the rows and columns corresponding to self-directed pairs out of the weight matrices, , , and .
The altered weight matrices are therefore conformable with the interstate data structure.
We illustrate this selection process with a simplified example. Suppose the locations of 4 countries are graphically represented as follows:
rejection sampling. The proposed value of is generated as a random deviation from the current value of with the random deviation drawn from a standard normal distribution and adjusted by a tuning parameter m. Specifically, . By monitoring the acceptance rates of the Metropolis-Hastings procedure, we set at 1/20 and the resulting acceptance rates for all 's are around 40%, consistent with the suggestion of LeSage and Pace (2009).
Country1
Country3 Country2
Country4
The row-standardized weight matrix for this simple example becomes The same operation is performed on and . Naturally, the altered weight matrices need to be row-standardized once again to reflect the exclusion of neighboring relationships with selfdirected pairs.
The new models employ the equations ( 8 ) and ( 9 ) in place of ( 4 ) and ( 1 ), with re-standardized matrices , , and . We estimate models given respectively by ( 3 ) and ( 8 ) and by ( 3 ) and ( 9 ) below. Each model now uses observations.
Marginal Effects in a Spatial OD Probit Model
Because of the inherent nonlinearity of any probit model, the marginal effect of a change in a regressor is not constant and depends on the initial level of the regressor. Researchers typically report the marginal effect for a mean value of each regressor or for a particular observation. In addition to the nonlinearity, calculation of marginal effects in this case faces three more hurdles: spatial spillover, exclusion of self-directed dyads, and origin-destination structure of the regressors.
The first complication is addressed by LeSage and Pace (2009) , who point out that a change in the value of an explanatory variable for a particular observation will not only affect that observation, but will spill over to other observations by way of the transmission mechanism for the spatial correlation. This spillover is intuitively similar to a multiplier effect in time series.
Leaving out self-directed dyads introduces a small amount of mathematical complication, which we address below. Third, the country-specific regressors have an origin-destination structure, defined above by Kronecker products with common matrices. Thus, a change in one country's regressor immediately affects all dyads in which that country is either an origin or a destination, and then the effects are propagated through the spatial diffusion mechanism to other dyads. The only columns of specific to each dyad rather than each country are the constant term and distance between countries in the dyad.
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Consider first the linear model in ( 9 ). We redefine The last line follows from the derivative of a trace (see, e.g., Lütkepohl, 1996) . This expression is an by matrix of partial derivatives, and the effect on of changing a certain countryspecific characteristic for a certain country is given by the element in the corresponding column and row, respectively. Such an effect could be written as
for country and characteristic .
For the model given jointly by ( 3 ) and ( 9 ) with a probit link function, the marginal effect on the probability of conflict initiation in dyad i given a change in characteristic k of country j is given by
using the usual chain rule. These marginal effects are of course estimated by inserting estimates of and , of which and are subvectors.
From these derivative matrices, scalar summaries for the whole system, along the lines of those proposed recently by LeSage and Thomas-Agnan (2012), may be created by averaging across all i and j. Or else, scalar summaries for individual origins, such as Germany, may be created by averaging across i with j fixed.
Spatial Correlation among Conflict Initiations
As Franzese and Hays (2007, p. 141) emphasize, spatial interdependence is substantively central to states' actions, including decisions on wars.
A notable feature of studies on interstate conflict is that the dyad is the favored unit of analysis since using a single dyadic observation better reflects interactions between two states than two separate observations (e.g., Bremer, 1992; Bennett and Stam, 2000) . However, many conflict scholars treat each incident of interstate conflict as a separate and isolated event, without giving due consideration to the interdependence that may exist among such incidents. Such uncorrelatedness is not realistic, as King (2001) and others have pointed out. For example, once a country is at war, its ability and willingness to get involved in another one will be affected. As a practical example, consider the debate in the U.S. about whether or not defense spending cuts would diminish its ability to wage two wars at the same time. Also, a country's decision to engage in conflict is conditional on the conflict status of "connected" pairs of countries (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2008 ).
However, current practice in conflict studies relies almost exclusively on geographical distance as a way of capturing the geopolitical nature of interstate war. 10 Although this variable may control for some spatial correlation, the effectiveness of such treatment has long been challenged (Anselin, 1988) . The omitted variable bias from ignoring spatial correlation in conflict studies may be particularly detrimental, because geographical proximity is an explanatory variable, and a growing number of conflict studies seek to address this neglect. 11 Beck et al. (2006) and Gartzke and Gleditsch (2008) represent recent efforts in modeling spatial correlation across dyads.
Many solutions proposed to address spatial correlation in existing conflict studies share a common drawback. The spatial connectivity they depict does not conceptualize war as a directional strategic behavior between two states. They therefore fail to take into account a key source of spatial dependence underlying the behavioral decision to wage war. Measuring the initiation of conflict is favored over simply measuring involvement, since the origin of the conflict may contain useful information, as noted by Ray (2001) . To this end, we employ directed dyads, which differentiate between aggressor (initiator or origin) and victim (target or destination). And the spatial OD probit model is fine-tuned to modeling the interdependence 10 Hegre et al. (2010) highlight the advantage of including geographic distance in the conflict equation, acknowledging that the logic of including distance in the gravity model of trade also applies to conflict. 11 For example, see Gleditsch and Ward (2000) , Ward and Gleditsch (2002) , Beck et al. (2006) , and Ward and Gleditsch (2008) .
processes of war initiation given this directed dyadic context and producing a fair assessment of the importance of explanatory variables.
Dispute Data
We analyze a cross-section of observations on the initiation of interstate conflict (specifically, the militarized interstate disputes defined below) between 26 European countries drawn from the Like many spatial analyses, we sample available data over the nine-year time span. We record values from 1932 for the explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity. 12 We thus obtain a crosssection of 650 observations of pairs of 26 countries, not including self-directed pairs. The countries are the U.K., Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Sweden.
We choose this region and period because (a) conflict initiations were relatively frequent and concentrated in this region during this time span, 13 and (b) we agree with Beck et al. (2006) that a European sample may include "high-quality" observations. This nine-year period is bracketed by Adolf Hitler's appointment to Chancellor of Germany in January of 1933 and his declaration 12 We obtained similar results (not shown) from using (a) the mid-period (1937) value, or (b) averaging each variable over the nine year interval for the conflict-free pairs and taking the values of the year previous to the first conflict initiation for each conflict pair. 13 Evidence from Gochman and Maoz (1984) suggests that the global number of conflicts was relatively low during the 1930's; however, the European number was relatively high. Otherwise, if the number of ones is too small, an alternative strategy might include adapting the spatial OD Poisson model of LeSage et al. (2007) , using a zeroinflated Poisson to accommodate infrequent conflicts. See also LeSage and Pace (2009 (Gochman and Maoz, 1984 ; see also Jones et al., 1996) . In the parlance of the correlates of war literature, the origin of the flow is referred to as the initiator and the destination is referred to as the target. Even if no MID occurred between two states, we refer to the first as the (potential) initiator and the second as the (potential) target.
The German invasion of Poland in 1939 is widely viewed to be the beginning of World War II in
Europe, yet the standard MID dataset reports Poland as the initiator. Instead, we use the "revisionist" MID dataset, which seeks to correct such idiosyncrasies by assigning the initiator to be the country that sought to alter the status quo.
14 The democratic peace proposition maintains that democratic countries are less prone to war due to the high levels of institutional constraints on decision-making (see Russett and Oneal, 2001; Choi, 2011) . To allow for this possibility, we include as regressors the democracy scores, polity1
and polity2, of the initiator and the target, respectively. 15 These measures aggregate five different aspects of democratic institutions in each country, and the average runs from -10 to 10, ranging from the most autocratic to the most democratic.
14 Only 18 observations are different across the two datasets. The revisionist dataset turns out to be more conservative: we obtained marginally more significant estimates (not shown) using the standard data. 15 These data were originally compiled by the Polity IV project.
Regressors measuring the national material capabilities of the initiator and target are represented by cap1 and cap2. Each state's national capability is assessed over six economic, demographic, and military components, using the well-known Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (see Singer et al., 1972) . This aggregate measure reflects a country's overall military and economic capacity for war. Including the capabilities separately better reflects each state's ability to project its power than does the capability ratio of the two states in the dyad (see Werner, 2000) .
Distance is measured in miles between capitals, adjusted for contiguity. Conventionally, distance is included to test the hypothesis that the geographic location of countries is a key factor in determining foreign policy (e.g., Hegre et al., 2010) . Distance may also help to capture some spatial correlation within a dyad, but its ability to capture such correlation across dyads is clearly limited. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2008) , for example, consider alliances in their application of a spatial model with dyadic dependent variable to international conflict. In the COW dataset, alliance is originally coded as a categorical variable, with 1=defense pact, 2=neutrality, 3=entente, and 4=no agreement. Following convention (e.g., Bennett, 2006) , we convert this variable to a binary regressor by combining the first three categories. Therefore, 1 indicates that a dyad had an alliance (using Bennett's terminology) while 0 denotes otherwise. An alliance may naturally dampen the probability that two countries will go to war. Of course, alliances may also be formed based on the same geopolitical factors that dampen that probability, creating an endogeneity problem.
( Table 1 about here) Geographic distance between observations serves as a basis for constructing the weight matrix that directly models the spatial connectivity structure. Although other measures of distance have been considered in other literatures (see LeSage and Pace, 2004, e.g.) , Gleditsch (2007) suggests that geographical proximity captures the most important correlations in this application.
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Specifically, is a row-standardized matrix constructed from the binary first-order contiguity matrix shown in Table 1 . , , and are defined from this matrix, as described above, to reflect initiator-, target-, and initiator-to-target-based correlation across dyadic observations.
Coefficient Estimates
Table 2 displays the empirical results from estimating the model given by ( 3 ) and ( 8 ) with a probit link function, both with and without allowing for spatial correlation, and from estimating the spatially correlated model given by ( 3 ) and ( 9 ) with a probit link function. Specifically, the standard probit estimator was used for the first two columns, showing point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. The Bayesian procedure described above was used for the last column. For the latter, we conducted 60,000 iterations and the first 10,000 were discarded as burn-in. We display the mean and 95% credible intervals from the posterior distribution of each coefficient.
( Table 2 about here) 16 In the spirit of Gartzke and Gleditsch (2008) and to alleviate the concern that the observed spatial connectivity among conflict initiation may only be a reflection of underlying alliances across dyads, we also constructed weight matrices based on alliance relationships and ran two other models (results not shown). In one model we replaced the distance-based weight matrices with alliance-based weight matrices, and in the other we included both sets of weight matrices. The model with only alliance-based weight matrices provided a worse fit, whereas the model estimated here provides about the same fit as the more inclusive model. These estimation results support the notion that strategic concerns trump political concerns, and, more specifically, they support Gleditsch's (2007) assertion about geographic proximity.
The signs of all of the point estimates are remarkably stable across all three models. We cannot compare the magnitudes across models without additional computations, because the coefficients reflect the presence or the lack of spatially lagged endogenous variables on the right-hand side.
Looking at the intervals for the coefficients in the spatial OD probit model, we note that three of the intervals other than that for the constant term do not contain zero. In other words, we may expect any credible value drawn from one of the coefficient distributions to have the same sign.
Military and economic capacity, as measured by the national capabilities covariate, clearly seems to increase the probability of initiating a conflict. Because the component series of these regressors are very persistent, the choice of base year (1932) should make very little difference.
This result supports the Realist view that considerations and evaluations of power are the prime determinants of war and peace.
That distance is negatively correlated with the probability of conflict is rather obvious, and it is consistent with theory in the existing literature (e.g., Boulding, 1963; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) .
Two countries separated by a large distance may be less subject to conflicts of interest.
The positive mean of suggests that states are more likely to attack the neighbors of their intended target as well, which may be attributable to logistical needs, strategic considerations, or an initiator's intention of reinforcing its position in the region by bringing more territory under its control. The famous Maginot Line provides an example in which we would expect this positive sign. Due to the construction of these fortifications along France's border with Germany, Germany was dissuaded from a direct attack on France. Instead, they invaded Belgium in order to attack France.
Looking briefly at the intervals that include zero, we find virtually no correlation between a country's level of democracy and its propensity to be involved in a conflict, both in a statistical and a substantive sense. This finding does not support the democratic peace proposition, in contrast to the findings of Russett and Oneal (2001) , Choi (2011) , inter alia. Yet it echoes that of Gowa (1999) , who finds the democracy level to be insignificant before 1939.
Diplomatic agreements seem to exhibit no discernible impact on the probability of a conflict, although the point estimate is positive. Oneal and Russett (1999) also report that alliances had little impact before 1940. And this finding is consistent with previous analyses of the relationship between alliances and wars (e.g., Ostrom and Hoole, 1978; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Bremer, 1992) .
The negative means of and hint that states are less likely to assault their potential target when their neighboring state is engaged in a conflict with the same target or with a neighbor of that target. A possible explanation is offered by Levy (1982) , who contends that war-weariness may inhibit war initiation behavior by other countries. As these intervals clearly include zero, the determination of negative signs is not conclusive.
Marginal Effects
LeSage and Pace (2009) and LeSage and Thomas-Agnan (2012) propose scalar summaries of marginal effects across the whole OD system. Such scalar summaries enable the calculation of both a direct effect -i.e., the effect of changing any country's regressor on pairs involving that country -and a network (indirect) effect -i.e., the effect on pairs not involving that country. By construction, network effects are all zero in models that do not allow for spatial correlation. The total effect is the sum of these two effects.
( Table 3 about here) Table 3 shows these effects for the benchmark OD probit model with no spatial correlation and those for the spatial OD probit model. The first two columns show the marginal effect on the latent , while the last two show the effect of . Both models estimate similar direct effects on both the latent and observed regressand. A 1% increase in the national military capability of a country (either potential initiator or target) increases the probability of conflict between that country and any other country by an average of 1.4%. However, the network effect is estimated to be negative. In other words, an increase in Germany's capability to wage war actually had an ameliorative effect on the relationship between, say, the United Kingdom and France. The empirical evidence supports the notion that two countries may become less prone to mutual conflict when facing an increased threat from a third country. A model with no spatial correlation cannot detect this effect.
Empirically interesting questions may be answered by considering the marginal impact of changing particular regressors for a particular country. For example, suppose that Germany had not taken the road of militarism leading up to WWII, but had instead maintained a national capability similar to that of Sweden. (The two countries had about the same area and Sweden's cap value stands at the median level of the sample). What might have been the difference in conflict probabilities under this counterfactual?
( Table 4 about here) Table 4 shows the baseline probabilities estimated by the model of a dispute initiated by Germany against each of the other sample countries. We report the marginal impact of a small (1%) reduction in Germany's capability using the formula derived above. We also report the forecast change in probability from changing Germany's capability from the recorded value of 0.0700 at the time to the sample median level of 0.0061.
The baseline probabilities calculated using the spatial OD probit model range from a 6.3%
probability that Germany would target Portugal to a 49.8% probability of targeting the Soviet Union. Omitting spatial effects by using the standard probit model generally underestimates this probability -by as much as 4.4% for Luxembourg and 3.7% for the Netherlands. In this case, the underestimation may result from failing to take into account geopolitical considerations, and these two countries along with Belgium are suggestive that the Maginot line may have increased the probability that these neighbors would be targeted.
The marginal effects of a 1% decrease in Germany's capability range from a very small decrease of 0.8% (vs. Portugal) to a more substantial decrease of 6.7% (vs. the Soviet Union) in the dispute probability. On average, the decrease is 3.4% for all pairs with conflict potentially originating with Germany, 1.9% for all pairs involving Germany, and 0.13% for the whole system. The estimated impacts from changing Germany's capability to the level of the sample median range from a 5.4% decrease (vs. Portugal) to an enormous 30.5% decrease (vs. the Soviet Union). On average, the decrease is 18.2% when Germany is the potential aggressor, 10.5%
when Germany is involved at all, and 0.63% for the whole system. The large numbers for
Germany reinforce the notion that military capabilities are a large determinant of martial behavior, and this finding is consistent with the Realist perspective on international relations.
The marginal effects of a change in national capability of all countries is summarized in Figure   1 , which shows [ ] , where denotes the national capability indicator.
We set to be the origin country, so that the figure shows the effect on the latent regressand of a unit decrease in the national capability of the potential aggressor. The axis showing the destination countries are ordered similarly but with self-directed pairs omitted, so that its numerical labels do not always coincide with the same potential target. For example, Germany (DEU) is the tenth origin country. For origin countries after the tenth (POL-SWE), Germany is the tenth destination; with an origin country of Germany, Germany is omitted as a destination;
and for origin countries before the tenth, Germany is the ninth destination, since one of the nine countries before Germany is omitted.
The topography of Figure 1 is clearly not flat, as it would be for the effects on the latent regressand of a probit model with no spatial spillovers. The marginal effect in that case would be flat at -15.079 (from Table 2 ). The average marginal effect over all country pairs in the figure is -14.348, about 5% less in absolute value. The roughness of the surface is not a small-sample artifact -all observations are used to estimate each of the marginal effects.
The most salient features are three peaks emerging from troughs. These peaks correspond to four observations (the left-most peak is actually a double peak): GBR-IRL, IRL-GBR, PRT-ESP, and SWE-FIN. The four origins are the only origins on the map with only one neighbor (Norway is excluded), and these observations correspond exactly to the relationships of those four countries with their only neighbors. The marginal effects of increasing national capabilities are much smaller (in absolute value) on threatening their only neighbors but larger on threatening other countries.
The latter result is quite sensible in light of the positions of these countries at the edge of the map. Their geographic remoteness insulates these countries from incursion, promoting security.
Diplomatic ties to their only neighbors are therefore particularly important, and military buildups, or other factors that might promote disputes, would be less likely to result in actual disputes. On the other hand, the security of geographic remoteness might spur such countries to more easily initiate disputes with countries beyond their neighbors if they covet more than just being situated in a peaceful corner.
Conclusion
Interstate conflict is widely studied by social scientists. However, most existing quantitative studies make the unrealistic assumption of no spatial correlation between either the initiators or the targets of such conflicts. Although recent advances in spatial analysis provide helpful tools for analyzing conflict initiation data, they are not quite enough. Existing tools for spatial analysis allow for binary data or dyadic data, but not for both.
Motivated by this application, we build on the existing spatial literature -most notably on works by LeSage (2000) and LeSage and Pace (2008, 2009 ) -to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a model and estimation strategy that allows for the combination of three distinctive features of the dependent variable: binary response, dyadic structure, and spatial correlation.
When applied to conflict initiation data, the three spatial connectivity matrices in our proposed spatial OD probit model are intended to capture multiple correlations between conflict initiations. The empirical results indicate that spatial correlation exists between conflict initiations, and that this correlation is more complex than that specified in the existing literature.
The positive and significant coefficient associated with target-centric correlation signifies that aggressors tend to attack the neighbors of their intended victims as well, possibly reflecting strategic or logistical needs.
More importantly, the allowance for spatial correlation enables us to examine effects from spillovers of conflict throughout the system. The spillovers that we estimate for one of the most significant determinants, national capability, suggest that two countries may be less prone to conflict when facing a threat from a third country. We also find that the effect of a military buildup has a different effect on countries at the edge of the map, a difference that a model without spatial correlation would not be able to detect. And, we find that decreasing Germany's military capability to that of the sample median would have had a substantial ameliorative effect on the probability of conflict between Germany and all other countries in the sample. Since
Germany's declaration of war on Poland is widely viewed to be the beginning of World War II in Europe, the 27% decrease seems to be historically significant.
We leave two important methodological considerations for future research. Second, natural extensions to other types of limited dependent variables that also have spatial dependence and a dyadic structure arise. International trade, for example, is measured as a continuous outcome, but is truncated at zero if trade does not occur or is too small to be reported.
Bilateral trade may of course be measured using directed dyads, and we can certainly expect a degree of spatial correlation as technologies used to produce export goods diffuse across borders, for example. Tables   Table 1. Binary matrix used to create row-standardized weight matrix W. 95% confidence intervals for ML-based estimates. 95% credible intervals for Bayesian estimates (sample size of 50,000). * denotes zero is not in the interval. 
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